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Abstract 
 
In this research paper, I attempt to investigate the impact of Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) on the socioeconomic status of local 
livelihood. The socioeconomic status that I examine is total household 
expenditure to capture the nutritional well-being of people who live in an 
area where the PES project is implemented. Not only total household 
spending, but I also examine the poverty status of each household in the 
area of PES project. The area of PES project that I analyze are villages in 
the vicinity of Meru Betiri National Park, East Java and Segara Basin, 
Lombok. I use Indonesian Social Economy National Surveys (SUSENAS) 
by Central Bureau of Statistics Republic of Indonesia (BPS), before and 
following the implementation of two PES implementation projects to 
examine the effect of PES in each location and both locations combined. 
To discuss the impact of PES, I use Difference-in-Difference method and 
also incorporate Propensity Score Matching to have a better result. I find 
that statistically, PES project has little significant impact on the 
socioeconomic status of local livelihood. However, if I look at the 
magnitude of the coefficient of the effect, the evidence show that PES has 
affected local livelihood positively. Furthermore, the effect of PES project 
differs between each location.  
 
Keywords: Environmental Services, Socioeconomics, Propensity Score 
Matching 
JEL Classification: O13, P28, R11 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sustainable development has become the major discourse in the 
development area. Since 1992, in the Rio de Janeiro, the sustainable development 
emerged to draw up the attention of international community. The actions and 
strategies formed in an attempt to start the development towards the more 
sustainable pattern.  Within which, countries and organization which presented civil 
society investigate the key works of development that bring harm to the 
environment. The notion of harming the environment bring about the development 
unsustain if it is left unchecked. Sustainable development itself has been known to 
the international community in 1972 at UN conference in Stockholm. The notion 
of sustainable development in its early announcement referred that development 
and environment is two separate issues which can mutually coexist.  
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Among many strategies that was proposed to be in action in the sustainable 
development is Payment for Environmental Services (PES). The strategy is to ‘buy’ 
Environmental Services (ES) from communities who live in the vicinity of forest 
or other natural resources – ES providers – which provide an additional benefit or 
protecting natural resources for other communities – ES buyers. Wunder (2005) 
describes PES as a voluntary transaction between ES providers and ES buyers on 
the well-defined ES. In which, ES providers have to secure ES provision. PES 
formed a valuation of opportunity benefit of natural resources-based incentive 
(Arriagada, 2008; Fisher & Turner 2008). By giving these incentives, it is hoped 
that the community will be more motivated in keeping forest cover intact, and the 
less inclined of other change of land uses. 
There are four environmental services (ES) that are currently stand out: 
carbon sequestration and storage, and landscape beauty, watershed protection, 
biodiversity protection, (Wunder, 2005). For instance, watershed protection ES is a 
payment from downstream water users to the upstream farmer to adopt land uses 
that limit soil erosion, deforestation, and flooding risk. Secondly, biodiversity 
protection ES is payment for local people to maintain or restoring areas to create a 
biological corridor. Thirdly, carbon sequestration and storage ES is payment to 
farmers that reside near a forest from donor(s) to maintain forest cover or plant new 
trees. Lastly, landscape beauty ES is payment for the local community for not to 
hunt and preserve the forest to be used as a tourist attraction.  
The program is mainly concerned with local communities within the natural 
ecosystem – with its nature in which compensating communities that highly 
dependent on natural resources. Since the community highly depends on the natural 
resources to obtain income, PES would have to make out conservation that 
financially viable for the community to maintain their earnings. Thus, the 
compensation that is provided by the program has to be able to elevate the standard 
of living of its recipients while improving environmental quality.  
It is challenging to pursue an objective that is meeting two goals at the same 
time in PES program – improving environmental quality and livelihood of people. 
The effect could be negative or positive to the social and economic outcomes 
(Zilberman et al. 2006). For instance, we can assume that PES will bring to the 
improvement of livelihood of the participants if the participants of this program are 
those below the poverty line and the compensation is large. However, if the benefits 
are small and received by those who are not poor, we can expect that the 
improvement of livelihood would be insignificant. Therefore, if the settlement is 
large but it highly restricts the change of land for agricultural activities, it will lead 
to the increase in poverty (Robalino, 2007). However, according to many 
researchers, PES can potentially address poverty issues as a conditional cash 
transfer, reducing or eliminating the tradeoff. The program may increase the income 
of the recipient, and it also may contribute to the reduction of poverty of local poor 
people because the program transfers money to residents (Landell-Mills & Porras 
2002; Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Ferraro & Simpson, 2002; Persson & 
Alpizar, 2011). 
The dilemma between the two objectives of PES has to be the primary 
consideration of government and agencies who is participating in PES project. The 
most common underlying problem are the restriction of land uses in the location 
where PES project implemented. The limitation of land uses can reduce income for 
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the local community. Therefore, another problem will occur when the amount 
compensation is less than the revenue that local people compensated. 
PES tends to be implemented in a particular location which makes the area 
with the program and the area without the program will vary in many dimensions. 
Hence, it has to be controlled. This paper data tries to find the socioeconomic 
outcome of PES project using national household survey. Pfaff & Robalino (2012) 
argued that the national household survey data can be used to control for individual 
and locality characteristics that affect the impact of the program. 
My study has several limitations. A major weak point of this paper is data 
availability because this paper relies on secondary data. This problematic since the 
targeted scope of this study is looking at household’s activities at household level 
in PES projects in Indonesia. Thus, the required data should be at the household 
level and cover many categories of household’s socioeconomic development that 
are related to the PES program, and it tends to have missing data. Moreover, using 
the difference in different methods has its limitation which is I have to find an area 
which has a baseline data and its follow-up. After countering such problem, I finally 
try to exercise the data from two PES projects which is watershed protection 
program in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara and forest protection program in Meru 
Betiri, East Java. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Natural resources provide plethora benefit for a human being. For instance, 
Forest is essential to life on Earth. It produces oxygen, and also it can be 
sequestrated carbon that can reduce the greenhouse effect. In addition to that, the 
forest also retains rainfall, filtering water and releasing it gradually. However, this 
hydrological services may not be noticed until deforestation takes a negative effect 
on human livelihoods, greatly, such as flood and degradation of water quality.  
In regards to that problem and the failure of the past approaches, society has 
considered the more effective and low cost by paying land users for their 
environmental services which give incentive to land users who live near the natural 
resources. It has led to the development of Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES). It is an approach where the environmental services should be compensated 
(Pagiola & Platais, 2016). The simple diagram of logical in PES can be seen in 
figure 1. The main idea of PES is that those who provide environmental services 
should be compensated, and those who receive the benefit should pay for the 
provision.  
 
Figure 1. The Simple Logic of Payment for Environmental Services 
Source: Pagiola & Platais (2016) 
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By linking the ES program to sustainable development, the majority of 
researchers argued that there are strong links between ES and sustainable 
development, particularly development efforts that aim to reduce rural poverty 
(Kaimowitz & Sheils, 2007; Karaeva & Marvier, 2007; Sachs & Reid, 2006; Tallis 
et al., 2008). According to Tallis et al., (2008), there are two ways to obtain the 
benefits of ES program which not only contribute to the conservation of natural 
environment but also give good value to sustainable development. First, we have to 
have a better understanding of how and at what rates environment produce these 
services can catch the attention of beneficiaries to pay for the conservation. When 
the benefits of the natural environment are explicitly quantified, those benefits are 
more valued both by the people who live in the vicinity of natural resources and the 
governmental or other agencies that would have to pay for a substitute source of 
income. Second, a focus on the conservation of ES may improve the success of 
projects that attempt to both goals of nurturing nature and local poor people by 
making markets for local people to sell their goods and services that are extracted 
from the ecosystem. 
 
Payment for Environmental Services in Meru Betiri, East Java, 
Indonesia 
Meru Betiri National Park in East Java, Indonesia, is acclaimed to have 
wealth biodiversity (TN. Meru Betiri 2012, ITTO 2009 as cited in Harada et al. 
2015). During the Dutch Colonial Government in 1931, the forest was first assigned 
as a protected area, largely intending to protecting the Javan Tiger (now considered 
extinct). The forest is home to an abundance of protected animals, including 180 
species of birds and 29 species of mammals (TN. Meru Betiri, 2012), and graduate 
to national park status in 1997. Despite the attempt to conserve the forest biological 
resources through the establishment of national parks, during the late 1990s to early 
2000s, the deforestation of the forest was alarming (Casson et al. 2007). It lost 
approximately 2,500 hectares due to the excessive land usage by companies and 
small-scale farmers who competed for remaining forestland.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of Meru Betiri National Park, West Java, Indonesia 
Source: Aliadi (2005) 
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However, due to the unprecedented deforestation, several agencies take the 
initiative to lessen the destruction of the forest. Took place in the buffer zone of the 
park, in 1994, Natural Tropical Institute, Lembaga Alam Tropika, (LATIN) and the 
Forest Department of Bogor Agricultural University set up a seven-hectare 
demonstration plot to promote agroforestry practices (Aliadi, 2005). The 
demonstration plots allegedly remained intact even though the high rate of 
deforestation at that time.  
After the initial success of the demonstration plot and to control 
deforestation rate of the forest, authorities approach LATIN to repeat the same 
program on additional plots throughout the park. It was then the extra plots of land 
being established in 2001. Around 3,500 households from five villages in the 
vicinity of the forest, namely Curahnongko, Andongrejo, Sanenrejo, Wonoasri, and 
Curahtakir, were involved in the forest rehabilitation program. Furthermore, some 
2,250 hectares of land had undergone reforestation by 2005. More than one hundred 
community forestry farmer groups with the assistance of local NGO, Sustainable 
Nature Conservation of Indonesia (KAIL) were engaged in the program of planting 
an initial 23,027 seedlings (Aliadi, 2005). The fund that is provided to plant the tree 
by the organizer of the project is Rp3,000.00 per seed. The delivery of fund 
comprises of two stages. The first stage delivery is Rp1,000.00 when the planting 
is commencing. The remaining Rp2,000.00 given after two months of verification 
of seed planting (Samdhana, 2015). The initiative not only benefits the forest, 
reestablished forest, but also produce secondary benefits to local villagers. It 
improves the livelihood of the villagers who are highly dependent on the forest, and 
it generates substantial opportunities for income for local people from the sale of 
forest products and medicinal plants.  
 
Payment for Environmental Services in Segara River, Lombok, West 
Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia 
Lombok island is located east of Bali island. It is one of the driest Indonesian 
islands. Most of the population resides in the South West of the islands with around 
400,000 inhabitants where the capital city Mataram is located. Jong Plan ka spring 
is used by Tanjung Regional Drinking Water Company (PDAM Tanjung). 
However, at the end of the 1990s, almost 50% of the springs dried up after the 
deforestation took place. Most people assumed that the fact of the dried springs 
connected with the deforestation (Munawir et al. 2003).  
 
 
Figure 3. Map of Location of PES Project in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia 
Source: Munawir et al. (2003) 
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Therefore, to diminish the effect of deforestation, several agencies started 
the development of Payments for Environmental Services (PES). For instance, 
PDAM Tanjung, in 2001, donating an annual fee of 2 million rupiahs to Bentek 
Village. PDAM also provides land compensation of about Rp500,000.00 per ha, for 
a 20-year concession. The company also agrees to cover the land tax owed by 
affected farmers for 30 years (Munawir et al. 2003). Another financial and technical 
support of international agencies, namely USAID, UNDP, and Ford Foundation, 
also initiated a program to reforesting Rinjani Mountain hills and adopting local 
practices.   
The water service payments in Segara Basin, Lombok comprises of several 
packages (Munawir et al., 2003). The first package mainly for contribution to 
village development. The first package contributed by Lombok Inter Rafting 
Company, the rafting company which uses Segara river as its primary location. The 
company pays Rp600,000.00 per village per year to the local council. The second 
package is from Regional Drinking Water Company to upstream community 
groups. The payments are Rp2,000,000.00 in 2001 and Rp5,000,000.00 from 2002 
onward.  
 
METHOD 
Data Collection 
The introduction of PES concept which leads to the implementation of PES 
pilot projects in 2001 was established by two institutions, namely the Institute of 
Research, Information, and Education of Social and Economic Affairs (LP3ES) and 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) (Budhi et al. 
2008). The initial pilot projects of PES were implemented in three locations: 
Cidanau (Banten Province), Brantas (East Java), and West Lombok Regency (West 
Nusa Tenggara). Another PES like the project was established in Meru Betiri (East 
Java), Sumber Jaya (Lampung), Kuningan (West Java), and in other location.   
This study implements the cross section/time series data set based on 
household units located in villages located in West Lombok Regency and Meru 
Betiri National Park. The two cross-section data collected under the Indonesian 
Social Economy National Surveys (SUSENAS) by Central Statistics Bureau of 
Indonesia (BPS), before and following the implementation of two PES 
implementation projects. Specific indicators are given by some assumptions to 
measure rural household’s expenditures in individual villages that are affected by 
the implementation of PES projects. These locations are chosen because they are 
among the first areas in which PES project implemented, where West Lombok 
Regency pertain with its watershed project (Munawir et al., 2003) while Meru Betiri 
concern with forest conservation (Aliadi, 2005). Both of them were initiated during 
the same period.  
Since those projects started in 2001, this paper uses SUSENAS 1999 data 
as a baseline survey two years before the PES projects implementation, and 
SUSENAS-2008 as the follow-up survey or post-implementation data. To attain the 
goal of this study, which is to evaluate the effect of implementation of PES, it is 
necessary to select villages that are affected by PES projects. To generate an explicit 
comparison between treatment and control group in the before and after a period of 
PES implementation, I select 64 households from 4 villages for treatment group and 
532 households from 34 villages as the control group which is households which 
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reside in the same province as the treatment group. The selection of treatment group 
based on the household who lives in the village where PES is implemented. I 
selected the control group by the district with the assumption that the characteristics 
of each household in the same district are indifferent. 
  
Model Specification 
The control group is households located near the location where PES is 
implemented. The baseline data is collected before the PES is implemented. The 
collection of data at this stage mainly on outcomes and it determinants both before 
and after the PES implemented. 
Suppose the total expenditure or poverty classifications of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
households in period 𝑡 are expressed by 𝑌𝑖𝑡, and then follow a simple OLS 
estimation: 
  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  … (3.1) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 is the parameter (intercepts), 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 represents dummy variable for 
implementation of PES, 𝛽 represents the impact of PES, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of 
characteristics of each household. We will also find some purely random error term 
that influences the impact of PES on socioeconomic development. it is represented 
in 𝜀𝑖𝑡, which are the serially uncorrelated transitory component that are not in our 
observation.  
 
Difference-in-Difference  
To find out the impact of PES implementation on socioeconomic 
development, we should compare the dependent variables of treatment group with 
the dependent variables of the control group in which the PES project is not 
implemented. The triple forms of basic treatment evaluation, 𝑌1𝑖, 𝑌0𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁, within the framework of a potential outcome model (POM) which assumes 
the treatment is potentially exposed in every element of the target population are 
assumed (Arriagada, 2008). In this paper, the variable 𝐷𝑖 which is the treatment 
variable, denoted by 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖, represents the treatment and control group, takes the 
value of 1 if there is a PES project and 0 otherwise. 𝑌1𝑖 represents the dependent 
variables for household 𝑖 in the PES project and 𝑌0𝑖 represents the dependent 
variables for household 𝑖 in which PES project is not implemented. Inline with the 
aforementioned model (3.1), each household has characteristics, referred to as 
covariates.  
In each project, the collection of data will consist of two periods, t=0,1. 
Where 0 indicates a time before the treatment group receives the intervention (the 
year 2000), called ‘pre-intervention’ and 1 means a time after the treatment group 
receives the intervention (the year 2008), which called ‘post-intervention.' Each 
household is indexed by 𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑛. 
The impacts of PES program can be estimated when the baseline data are 
available by assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity is time-invariant and 
uncorrelated with the treatment over time. After the PES project is implemented, 
we can calculate the individual gain from PES implementation which is measured 
by 𝜏𝑖 = (𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖) (Arriagada 2008). 
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To have a better understanding of the equation of Difference-in-Difference, 
according to Greene (2003), the form of DD estimation in this paper can become: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖. 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  … (3.2) 
where 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖 is a dummy variable that is one for treated group and zero for untreated 
group. 𝑇𝑡 is dummy variable of pre-intervention and post-intervention, 0 and 1 
respectively. The change in the outcome variable for the treated group will be: 
 
(𝑌𝑖2|𝑃𝐸𝑆1 = 1) − (𝑌𝑖1|𝑃𝐸𝑆1 = 1) = (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 + 𝛽4) − (𝛽1 + 𝛽3)
=  𝛽2 + 𝛽4 … (3.3) 
 
for the controls: 
 
(𝑌𝑖2|𝑃𝐸𝑆1 = 0) − (𝑌𝑖1|𝑃𝐸𝑆1 = 0) = (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) − (𝛽1) =  𝛽2 … (3.4) 
 
the DD effect will be: 
 
[(𝑌i2|PES1 = 1) − (Yi1|PES1 = 1)] − [(Yi2|PES1 = 0) − (Yi1|PES1 = 0)]
= β4 … (3.5) 
 
In order the DD estimator is interpreted correctly, the assumption of error 
term is uncorrelated must be held: 
Cov(εit, Ti1) = 0 
Cov(εit, t) = 0 
Cov(εit, Ti1t) = 0 
 
The assumption is known as the ‘parallel-trend’ assumption. It means 
“unobserved characteristics affecting program participation do not vary over time 
with treatment status” (Khandker et al., 2010:73). 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
In this paper, I use the combination of DD method and PSM. I use this 
method because I face the problem which is the identification of the unobservable 
outcome which is the counterfactual outcome. The problem occurs since I want to 
estimate the difference outcome of household in the treated and untreated group of 
intervention. 
After the PES project is implemented, we can calculate the individual gain 
from PES implementation which is measured by τi = (Y1i − Y0i). However, the 
evaluation problem occurs in this step because in each household i, only one of the 
potential outcomes is observed (Arriagada, 2008:73). 
Due to the problem mention above, there will be no confidence in estimating 
individual program impacts upon socioeconomic development. However, there still 
be a way out to overcome that problem which is the population average of gains 
from PES projects. The population averages of the frequency distributions of Y1i 
and Y0i can be estimated for treated and untreated group (Frondel and Schmidt 
2005:519). The population average treatment effect (ATE) can measure the average 
causal effect of treated group (PESi = 1) relative to untreated group (PESi = 0): 
 
τATE = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)] … (3.6) 
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where E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)i|PES(1)] represents the mean of all households that is 
affected by the implementation of PES. The average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) is defined by the following equation: 
 
τATt = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|PES = 1] … (3.7) 
 
The ATT will be threatened by several complications when the 
observational data is compiled under nonrandom treatment assignment. “The 
possible complications are a possible correlation between the outcomes and 
treatment, omitted variables, and endogeneity of the treatment variable” (Cameron 
& Trivedi 2005:34).  
Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983:54) suggest that to focus on adjusting for 
differences in the propensity score – the conditional probability of receiving the 
treatment – when the problem above occurs. They also recommend using the 
balancing score had the dimensionality problem occurs. They show that if potential 
outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on covariates, they are also 
independent of treatment conditional on a balancing score. A possible balancing 
score is the propensity score, 
 
Pr(PES = 1|X) = e(X). 
 
If we have strong ignitability and the assumption of unconfoundedness and 
the overlapping holds, the propensity score matching estimator for ATT can be 
written in general as: 
 
τPSM
ATT = EP(X)|PES=1{E[Y(1)|PES = 1, e(X)] − E[Y(0)|PES = 0, e(X)]} … (3.12) 
 
According to Arriagada (2008), “the propensity score matching estimator is 
simply the mean difference in outcomes over the common support, appropriately 
weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants.” The matching in 
PSM is based on the unobservable characteristics between treatment and control 
group.  
In this study, I use a logit model to estimate the outcomes or PSM approach. 
According to Hirano et al. (2003:1175), the overlap observation which is crucial in 
this method is denser than any other model. Furthermore, Ravallion (2001:125) 
suggest that “the error term in the outcome equation has a logistic distribution and 
estimate that the parameter consistent with the assumption by the maximum 
likelihood.”  
Therefore, this paper exercises the DD estimation by comparing the change 
of outcomes for the treated and control group in the period before and after the 
implementation of PES project. Because the treatment group is the same in the pre 
and post implementation, we can take the difference between them: 
 
[Yi(1) − Yi(0)] = αi + β(PESi(1) − PESi(0)) + γXi + θZi
+ (εi(1) − εi(0)) … (3.13) 
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Furthermore, I can adjust propensity score in the DD regression to estimate 
the impact of the implementation of PES project on the socio-economic activities 
with match observation: 
 
DDi = [Yi1(1) − Yi1(0)] − ∑ ω(i, j)[Yi0(1) − Yi0(0)
j=0
] … (3.14) 
 
where ω(i, j) is the weight (calculated using PSM approach) given to the post-
treatment, jth, households in control group, and matched with households in 
treatment group (Khandker et al. 2010:80). A weighted least square regression 
using the PSM will generate an efficient estimator in the matching of control group 
observation (Hirano et al. 2003:1175).  
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Pre-regression 
To avoid miss-estimation of the model, I do pre-regression procedures using 
a diagnostic test. Similar information about the dependent variable more likely 
appears where there are continuous variables. To avoid the miss-estimation, 
multicollinearity test should be attempted. Table 5 shows that there are no 
correlations among variables that is used in this study.  
 
Table 1. Multicollinearity Test 
 lexptot pov linc lpfarm lnfarm edu wrkhr famsize 
Lexptot 1.0000        
Pov -0.2547* 1.0000       
Linc -0.0458 0.6517* 1.0000      
Lpfarm 0.0120   -0.0077    0.0587* 1.0000     
Lnfarm 0.0871*   0.1412*   0.1347* -0.4784* 1.0000    
Edu 0.5647*  -0.1544* -0.2065*   0.1112* -0.0534 1.0000   
Wrkhr 0.1495*   0.0410    0.1355* -0.0467    0.0677   -0.0307 1.0000  
Famsize 0.5230*  -0.4382*   0.0084    0.0118 0.0032    0.0466   -0.0096 1.0000 
*Significant at 95% 
 
Evidence from simple OLS  
Table 6 present the effects of PES implementation program. It shows that, 
overall, the PES project does not have a significant impact on local household 
socioeconomic status both on total expense and poverty status. However, if we 
divide the project into two different districts – Meru Betiri and Lombok –, we find 
that the project has a significant effect on each household, except for total 
expenditure in Meru Betiri. The project increases the total expenditure by 14%. 
Generally, the project has no significant effect on each household. The project 
worsens the poverty status in Meru Betiri by 0.14 level. In Lombok, the project 
increases total expenditure by 0.18%, and it also deteriorates the poverty by 0.06 
level. The result points out that the project has no significant effect. 
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Table 2. Difference in Difference Effect of PES 
 Dependent Variables 
 All Meru Betiri Lombok 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables lexptot pov lexptot pov lexptot pov 
Constant 10.14*** -11.87*** 0.141** 0.148 0.00176 0.0562 
 (0.374) (1.217) (0.0510) (0.220) (0.0502) (0.367) 
Pes  0.0664 0.0615 -0.194 -1.065*** -0.361** -1.460*** 
 (0.0447) (0.200) (0.128) (0.172) (0.139) (0.365) 
Year (dummy) -0.269*** -1.228*** -0.282* -0.893*** 0.0912 0.433 
 (0.0930) (0.185) (0.153) (0.223) (0.131) (0.485) 
DD interaction -0.0942 -0.385 0.141** 0.148 0.00176 0.0562 
 (0.117) (0.293) (0.0510) (0.220) (0.0502) (0.367) 
Other controls Full set Full set Full set Full set Full set Full set 
Observations 424 424 223 223 201 201 
R-squared 0.473 0.665 0.539 0.682 0.421 0.665 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                     
Difference-in-Difference with Propensity Score Matching 
Since it is not possible to randomly assigning observations that receive the 
intervention or not, I use the matching technique to reduce bias. This study uses 64 
observations as the treatment group, and it is composed of 11% of total observation. 
Based on the SUSENAS, I use household which is not affected by as control group 
as many 532 observations which are 89% of total observation. However, based on 
the propensity score, there is a restriction to capture baseline characteristic of each 
observation. Thus, only 44 and 324 observations for treatment and control groups 
respectively.  
Common support test and propensity histogram should be done to prove that 
there is an overlap condition of observations which indicates that treatment and 
control group have similar characteristics. Mainly, this test purpose is to make sure 
that there is sufficient treatment and control group that overlaps with each other to 
make an acceptable comparison. Figure 5 depicts a graph of control and treatment 
group of the project. It shows that there is sufficient overlap observation of 
treatment and control group. Figure 6 shows the propensity histogram that depicts 
reasonable numbers of control observation to be matched with the treatment cases.  
 
Figure 4. Common Support Graph 
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Figure 5. Propensity Histogram 
 
Table 3 depicts that NN matching produces greater bias than kernel 
matching. It can be assumed that Kernel matching gives a more appropriate 
estimation than NN matching. 
 
Table 3. Bias After Matching 
 Total expenditure Poverty status 
 ATT estimation   ATT estimation   
Matching Method n. 
treat 
n. 
control 
Bias  Bias 
Redu
ction 
n. 
treat 
n. 
control 
Bias Bias 
Reduction 
NN matching 44 324 0.1131 0.553 44 324 0.3230 0.493 
Kernel Matching 44 324 0.0634 0.062 44 324 0.1719 0.044 
 
The impact of PES project implementation on the total expenditure and 
poverty status of household is presented in Table 8. The table shows impact 
estimations from Nearest Neighbor and Kernel matching techniques on total 
household expenditure and poverty classifications as the dependent variable.  
Overall, PES project implementation does not significantly affect the 
household’s socioeconomic status. In the presence of PES, NN matching estimates 
that PES project decreases household expenditure by 30%. However, NN matching 
has the highest bias among another method. Furthermore, using Kernel matching, I 
find that household’s expenditure might decrease by approximately 3% because of 
the implementation of PES.  
For poverty classification, NN matching estimates that the implementation 
of PES lessens the poverty by 0.74 points. Kernel matching estimation shows that 
the implementation of PES only lessens poverty by 0.07 point, which means the 
project does not have a significant effect on the poverty alleviation.   
Furthermore, after I split the area of the project, I find that, in Meru Betiri, 
the total expense has been affected by PES project has a different course. Using NN 
matching, the project lowering the total expense by 14%. Nevertheless, using kernel 
matching, the program increasing total expense by 2%. Poverty status also has a 
different course of the result. While NN matching resulted that the project lowers it 
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by 1.18 level, the Kernel matching shows that PES push poverty status up by 0.07 
level. Only poverty status’ impact estimation using NN matching has a statistically 
significant result.  
In Lombok, PES project has a significant effect on total expenditure using 
NN matching. Its effect is that it lowers total expenditure by 53%. The project 
lowers expenditure by 14% Using kernel matching. However, statistically, it is not 
significant. On the poverty status, both matchings show that the project has no 
statistically significant result. While kernel matching shows that the program 
increases the status of poverty of each household by 0.04 level, NN matching shows 
no estimated effect on poverty status.  
 
Table 4. Meru Betiri and Lombok Combined 
 Dependent Variables 
 Total Expense Poverty Status 
Matching 
Method 
Impact 
estimation 
S.D. Sig. Impact 
Estimation 
S.D. Sig. 
NN Method -0.2971 0.1131 0.0087*** 0.7386 0.3230 0.7465 
Kernel Matching -0.0334 0.0643 0.9733 0.0652 0.1797 0.8647 
*significant in 90%; ** significant in 95%; ***significant in 99% 
 
Table 5. Meru Betiri 
 Dependent Variables 
 Total Expense Poverty Status 
Matching 
Method 
Impact 
estimation 
S.D. Sig. Impact 
Estimatio
n 
S.D. Sig. 
NN Method -0.1406 0.1264 0.1340 1.18 0.4784 0.0071*** 
Kernel Matching 0.0208 0 .0783 0.3936 -0.0159 0.2561 0.4761 
*significant in 90%; ** significant in 95%; ***significant in 99% 
 
Table 6. Lombok 
 Dependent Variables 
 Total Expense Poverty Status 
Matching 
Method 
Impact 
estimation 
S.D. Sig. Impact 
Estimation 
S.D. Sig. 
NN Method -0.5289 0.1597 0.001*** 0 0.4815 0.5000 
Kernel Matching -0.1488 0.1143 0.092 0.0406 0.2870 0.4443 
*significant in 90%; ** significant in 95%; ***significant in 99% 
Evidence from OLS with propensity score 
 
In the last step of examination, I use OLS with propensity score adjustment 
to estimate the impact of PES projects implementation. The difference in difference 
effect of PES project on household socioeconomic characteristics can be found in 
Table 10 for each outcome. Generally, the table shows that there is no significant 
effect of PES on both total expenditure (lexptot) and poverty status (pov). The 
project is negatively affecting the treated group’s total expenditure by 17%. The 
level of poverty decreases by 0.54 level. It means that both econometrically and 
economically, the project does not affect the treated group much. However, in Meru 
Betiri, the poverty status is significantly affected by the project. It is worsening the 
household poverty status by 1.3 level. Nevertheless, the DD estimation shows that 
 Jurnal Ekonomi dan Studi Pembangunan, 9 (2), 2017 
  ISSN 2086-1575   E-ISSN 2502-7115 
 
213 
 
– even though it has 32.8% of the decrease in total expense of each household – 
PES does not have a significant effect. In Lombok, PES is positively affecting the 
total expenditure by 25.3% and poverty status by 0.44 level. But, it does not have 
significant evidence in the calculation.  
 
Table 7. Difference-in-Difference Estimation of PES Projects 
 Dependent Variables 
 All Meru Betiri Lombok 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Lexptot pov lexptot pov lexptot pov 
Constant 9.8662*** -14.4821*** 9.9918*** -12.9612*** 9.6333*** -
16.2877*** 
 (8.9246) (1.2594) (0 .4368) (1.3041) (0.8224) (2.5314) 
Pes 0.1103** 0 .1340 0.1586** 0.2074 0.07778 0.1316 
 (0.0447) (0.2108) (0. .0646) (0.3151) (0 .0681) (0.2759) 
Year 
(dummy) 
-0.2870 -1.7070*** -0.1055 -1.3819*** -0.7113** -2.5076*** 
 (0.2190) (0.3049) (0.2312) (0. .3115) (0.2917) (0.5440) 
DD 
interaction 
-0.1753 -0.5363 -0.3279 -1.2687* 0.2528 0.4440 
 (0.2529) (0. 4756) (0.2941) (0.6592) (0.2941) (0.6869) 
Other 
controls 
Full set Full set Full set Full set Full set Full set 
Observati
ons 
398 398 212 212 186 186 
R-squared 0.479 0.686 0.535 0.674 0.467 0.715 
Robust standard error in parenthesis 
*significant in 90%; ** significant in 95%; ***significant in 99% 
 
Discussion 
Based on the evidence of difference-in-difference estimation in simple OLS 
regression, generally, there is no significant effect of PES project both in total 
expenditure and poverty status after controlling for total income, total income from 
farming, total income from non-farming, education attainment, working hours, and 
family size. The statistically significant effect of pes is in Meru Betiri on total 
expenditure of households. The program increase households’ total expense by 
14%.  
If we look at the effect of PES project between control and treatment group 
we find that the project, in the combined model, has very small effect on both 
groups. The treated household has 6% more total expenditure than the controls. In 
the poverty status, the treated is better by 0.06 level than the controls1. The 
coefficient is very small. It shows that the effect of both groups is not significant. 
Moreover, statistically, it has no significant evidence.  
After splitting the area into two, I find that the effect between treated and 
controls has different result. In Meru Betiri, household that are in the area of PES 
project has lower total expenditure than the control group by 19% - even though 
statistically insignificant – and they also have lower poverty status than the controls 
by 1 level. The treated has lower expenditure than the controls by 36%. Further, 
                                                     
1 The higher the level the better the poverty status is. (Poverty status ranging from 
1-5 level). 
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PES project in Lombok also has negative result. In poverty status, after the PES 
project is implemented, the treated has lower poverty status than the control by 1.5 
level.  
In the second estimation using DD with Propensity Score Matching, the 
effect of PES project in combined model shows that the only significant effect is 
the total expenditure of each household. The project has impacted the decrease in 
total expenditure by 30% using Nearest Neighbor matching. On the other hand, 
using Kernel matching, the impact only lower the total expense by 3%. In poverty 
status, both matching shows no significant effect of PES. The impact only shows 
0.73 and 0.06 level rise of poverty status on NN matching and Kernel matching, 
respectively, which is very small.  
When splitting the area into two provinces, only poverty status in Meru 
Betiri and total expenditure in Lombok which shows the significant effect of PES 
project. In regard to this is important to note that only poverty status that has 
significant effect on Meru Betiri and total expenditure in Lombok, both using NN 
matching.  
In Meru Betiri, PES has different impact between NN matching and Kernel 
Matching. While it lowers the expenditure by 14% using NN matching, Kernel 
matching resulted on that PES increase total expenditure by only 2%. Furthermore, 
the project increases the poverty status by 1.18 level – which is significant – using 
NN matching. On the other hand, using Kernel matching, it decreases the level of 
poverty status by 0.02 level.  
The evidence from Lombok shows that the effect of PES is decreased total 
expenditure by 53% using NN matching and 15% using Kernel matching. However, 
poverty status shows no significant evidence. Using NN matching there is no 
impact while using Kernel matching it increases the status level by 0.04.   
In the third estimation, which is OLS with propensity score, PES project has 
no significant effect both on total expenditure and poverty status in all area. The 
project pushes total expenditure by 17% and poverty status by 0.54 level. However, 
when I split into two provinces, the result shows there is a significant effect on 
poverty status in Meru Betiri. It lowers the status by 1.27 level. Total expenditure 
in Meru Betiri has slight decrease by 33%. In Lombok, both total expenditure and 
poverty status has no significant effect on PES project. The project increases total 
expenditure by 25%. It also pull-up the poverty status by 0.44 level.  
There is different result while using three different statistical methods. First, 
In the simple OLS, generally, PES has no significant effect on local socioeconomic 
status. Only when splitting the area into two areas, the evidence shows that in Meru 
Betiri the project has statistically significant on total expenditure. Second, using 
DD with PSM, in combined area, the project has a significant effect on total 
expenditure using NN matching. When estimating the impact while splitting the 
area into two, the significance of PES project is on poverty status in Meru Betiri 
and total expenditure in Lombok, both using NN matching. Lastly, using OLS with 
propensity score, in combined area, PES project has no significant effect. The 
insignificant effect also occurs when I estimate the effect of PES while using two 
provinces, except for poverty status in Meru Betiri. 
While the statistics estimation shows that the project has no significant 
effect, if we see it economically, PES has the effect of lowering total expenditure 
between 9% to 53%. The biggest impact is in Lombok using NN matching which 
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is 53%, while the lowest impact is when using simple OLS. This difference might 
be due to the advantages of PSM which are imposed common support and semi-
parametric (CIE). The common support compares the comparable and semi-
parametric only parameterizes the participation while regression is fully parametric. 
In poverty status, PES has two different results which are lowering the level of 
poverty status and upgrade the status of each household. The most significant and 
less bias is when I estimate using PSM – NN matching –, PES significantly 
improving poverty status of household by one level.  
To sum up, while there is no strong significant statistical evident on PES 
impact, we can say that the project has the impact on socioeconomic status when 
we see it from the coefficient of the impact estimator. From the evidence above, 
PES has a positive effect on the socioeconomic status of local livelihood. Moreover, 
the effect of PES differs in each location of implementation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that environmental services have important value to overall human 
well-being is well recognized (MEA, 2005). However, to have the environmental 
services managed and conserved, it will impose a cost which also generates benefit 
(West et al., 2006; Abel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005).  The cost of maintaining 
environmental services not only to preserve the ecosystem of natural resources but 
also to maintain the well-being of local people who live in the vicinity of those 
natural resources. Both scientist and conservationists have been taken an interest in 
a tool to help both people and biodiversity by maintaining environmental services. 
A project that use environmental services to advantage both people and biodiversity 
simultaneously has been researched. It has led to the development of Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES). It is an approach which has two objectives: 
conserve natural resources and improve people well-being.  
However, to obtain both objectives is slightly complicated. The effect of 
PES still been in the discourse of researchers. With dual purposes, it might be 
benefited one side while the other side suffers. Therefore, the best system to apply 
PES is still in the development process. Even though there are many PES program 
that has been successfully implemented and bring forth a good result. Regardless 
of how the PES has been successfully implemented, developing countries still are 
laboratories to find out the effect of implementation of this program. Indonesia is 
one of them. Although it has great PES and PES-like program, the empirical 
research about the effect of the program is still lacking.  
This paper attempts to fulfill the causality gap of between people who highly 
dependent on the forest and implementation of PES project. This paper examines 
whether the PES has a positive and significant effect on socioeconomic 
development in the area where the project was implemented. I use two sets of data 
survey which assumed to have similar characteristics in the baseline period as 
treatment and control group. After exercise matching, the data that is used in this 
paper is 368 observations. The data sets consist of 1999 and 2008 surveys as 
baseline and follow-up data, respectively. Based on the data that I use, this study 
only captures a short-term impact of the implementation of PES. 
The main finding of this paper is that PES project has no statistically 
significant effect on total expenditure and poverty status. However, based on the 
magnitude of the coefficient, the project proofed to has effect in lowering total 
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expenditure by 53% and improving poverty status by 1 level.  Further study needs 
to be done to find out whether PES has reduced the total expenditure of local 
household.  
Based on the evidence, PES affecting total expenditure positively and it also 
has a positive effect on poverty status. The evidence also shows that the effect of 
PES project differs between each location where it is implemented. However, both 
evidence is not strongly supported by the statistical significance. 
Additional notes on PES program based on the result is that the 
implementation of PES programs has to be reassessed. Not only PES in Indonesia, 
but also as the program itself as a whole. Can the program met its core purposes to 
promote local livelihood and nurturing natural resources? Has it step in the early 
stage of being the solution of Sustainable Development? 
Finally, I have some suggestion for further research on evaluating the 
impact of PES projects on household livelihood. First, to have the more profound 
result of the impact of PES implementation on household, another variable such as 
distance to the nearest market can be added. The reason for this is that household 
distance to the market can depict their economic behavior such as selling natural 
resources or spending money. Furthermore, deforestation rate can also be included. 
It can show how local people do their responsibility on nurturing forest cover. 
Second, in evaluating policy, a longer period of study can give more comprehension 
on how the policy is implemented. It also applied in PES project, evaluating the 
impact in a long period will have more benefit to it. Moreover, larger observations 
will also make the evaluation more profound. It is better if the future study can 
involve more extensive observations which consist of all PES project in Indonesia 
to capture some more generalized findings.  
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